The Principles of Psychology
James treats attention, habit, emotion and the self as living functions of an organism adapting to its world, in prose that founded American psychology.
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James treats attention, habit, emotion and the self as living functions of an organism adapting to its world, in prose that founded American psychology.
Freud argues that dreams disguise forbidden wishes, introducing the unconscious, dream-work and free association to a general readership.
Freud divides mental life into id, ego and superego, giving clinical practice its structural vocabulary of conflict and defence.
Jung proposes introverted and extraverted attitudes combined with four functions, building a typology of conscious orientation.
Early English translations of Jung's essays on association, dementia praecox and the unconscious, showing his work before the split with Freud.
Adler explains character as a style of striving for significance shaped by early family position and feelings of inferiority.
Pavlov reports decades of experiments on salivation, showing how arbitrary signals acquire control over physiological responses.
Watson popularises a psychology of stimulus and response, promising that environment can shape any healthy infant into any chosen specialist.
Thorndike describes puzzle-box experiments with cats and chicks, concluding that learning proceeds by trial, error and satisfaction.
Using nonsense syllables on himself, Ebbinghaus measures forgetting, spacing and practice effects, inventing the experimental study of memory.
Binet and Simon describe their intelligence scale and insist it is a rough educational aid, not a fixed measure of worth.
Montessori describes her children's houses, the prepared environment and self-correcting materials, arguing for independence within carefully designed limits.
Piaget observes children's speech and reasoning, distinguishing egocentric talk from genuine social exchange and mapping early logic.
Galton argues that eminence runs in families and therefore intelligence is inherited, using genealogies of judges, scientists and statesmen.
Köhler's chimpanzees solve problems by sudden insight rather than trial and error, evidence he used against associationist accounts of thought.
Bowlby integrates ethology, psychoanalysis and developmental data to argue that a secure early bond regulates a child's later relationships.
Ainsworth and colleagues present the Strange Situation procedure and the secure, avoidant and ambivalent patterns observed in infants.
Winnicott explores transitional objects, play and the good-enough mother, locating creativity in the space between self and world.
Klein reports play-technique analyses of young children, proposing early object relations, envy and the paranoid-schizoid position.
Anna Freud catalogues how the ego wards off anxiety through repression, projection, denial and other defences, with clinical illustrations.
Mahler traces symbiosis, separation and individuation in early childhood, describing how a toddler moves away and returns.
Erikson sets eight psychosocial stages across the lifespan, from trust to integrity, joining clinical work with cultural observation.
Skinner presents operant conditioning experiments, defining reinforcement, extinction and schedules in precise laboratory terms.
Rogers describes person-centred therapy, arguing that empathy, congruence and unconditional regard let clients direct their own growth.
Maslow sketches growth motivation, peak experience and self-actualisation, arguing psychology should study healthy people as well as patients.
Frankl recounts concentration-camp survival and argues that meaning, chosen responsively, sustains people through unavoidable suffering.
Beck argues that depression and anxiety follow from distorted interpretations, and shows how structured questioning can revise them.
Seligman links explanatory style to helplessness and depression, then offers techniques for disputing pessimistic interpretations.
Neisser names and defines the cognitive revolution, treating perception, memory and thought as information processing that can be measured.
Milgram reports his obedience experiments and argues that ordinary people will follow harmful orders when an authority takes responsibility.
Zimbardo uses the Stanford prison study and Abu Ghraib to argue that situations and systems can turn ordinary people cruel.
Kahneman summarises decades of research on two modes of thought and the biases that make expert judgement predictably unreliable.
Damasio argues that emotion is indispensable to rational decision-making, using neurological cases to link body states and judgement.
Porges proposes that the vagus nerve supports distinct defensive and social states, linking autonomic physiology to behaviour and safety.
Van der Kolk describes how trauma is held in body and brain, and surveys treatments from yoga and EMDR to talking therapy.
Siegel and Bryson translate developmental neuroscience into twelve strategies for helping children integrate emotion, memory and attention.
Faber and Mazlish offer concrete scripts for acknowledging feelings, offering choices and solving problems without punishment.
Gottman distils observational research on couples into patterns that predict stability, from fondness to handling conflict.
Grandin describes autistic visual thinking and links it to animal handling design, education and employment.
Gilligan argues that psychological theory has treated male reasoning as the norm and missed an ethics of care and relationship.
Loftus shows how wording, stress and suggestion corrupt memory, and why confident eyewitnesses are often wrong.
Linehan sets out mindfulness, distress tolerance, emotion regulation and interpersonal skills as a structured curriculum.
Johnson applies attachment theory to couples, showing how protest, withdrawal and pursuit hide needs for safe connection.
Sapolsky traces a behaviour from milliseconds of neural firing to millions of years of evolution, refusing single-cause explanations.
Pinker argues against the idea that the mind is wholly formed by culture, reviewing evidence for innate structure.